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Abstract
Coconut-based intercropping (CBI) in Sri Lanka was introduced some 20 years ago to overcome the two main limitations
of traditional coconut monocropping, inefficient land use and low incomes to farmers, but it has not been widely
adopted. This study analyses the effect of farm-level resource constraints, and government policies on the intensity of
adoption of CBI. A multiperiod linear programming (MLP) model was applied for three farmer groups - resource poor,
medium endowed, well endowed - categorised using cluster analysis. Data was collected from a survey of randomly
selected 113 intercroppers.
Empirical results reveal that expansion of CBI is mainly constrained by seasonal labour shortages for all farmer groups,
particularly the well endowed, and by the scarcity of cash in the case of resource-poor farmers. CBI policies aimed at
subsidising inputs or intercrop prices are not likely to be efficient in raising adoption, but alternative policies aimed at
alleviating resource constraints would be more effective.
The study concluded that the low adoption of CBI is mainly attributable to the scarcity of different farm-level resources
(other than land), at varying degrees among different farmer groups. Hence a targeted approach to alleviate them is
suggested.
Introduction
Coconuts are the second most important crop in Sri Lanka after rice, occupying 25% of cultivable land and making the
greatest contribution to GDP of plantation crops. Originally a plantation crop, coconuts have a productive life of over 60
years with a low labour requirement of 0.25 worker/ha/year.  The crop has become popular with peasant cultivators and is
now principally a smallholder’s crop with 75% of the coconut area in holdings less than 8 ha.Coconut-based intercropping (CBI) in Sri Lanka is important for two main reasons. First, coconut monocropping is less
profitable than the intensified land use system of CBI. Second, per caput arable land availability is rapidly declining due
to the increasing population and the use of cultivable (mainly coconut) lands for industry, housing and roads. Coconuts
must be spaced at about 8 m due to the leaf canopy between years 5-8 and 20-25.  Up to year 5-8 and after year 20-
25 they do not fully utilise the space, the root bole being 2m around the tree, thus intercropping is possible with 75 % of
the area and 44% of the radiation unutilised. If the intercrops are correctly fertilised there is actually an increase in
coconut yield.
Policies of the Sri Lanka government aimed at expanding CBI have included:-
a) An intercropping subsidy given only in kind, i.e. planting materials and fertiliser, for intercrops such as
coffee, pepper, cocoa, lime, lemon, banana, pineapple, passion fruit and pawpaw.
b) A fertiliser subsidy of 50% of the import price of fertiliser as a direct payment to importers from 1972-1989
and again briefly in 1994.
c) Subsidised credit interest rate of 14% including for, increasing perennial and semi-perennial crop production,
optimising land use, and increasing farm income.
d) Extension services to provide advice promote intercropping and administer subsidies.
Despite government promotion of CBI for nearly two decades, only 25% of the potential area is intercropped. The results
reported here, are part of a study of the socioeconomic reasons for the poor uptake of CBI by smallholders in Sri Lanka.
The aggregate area of CBI depends upon the incidence of CBI i.e. the number of farms intercropping and the intensity or
proportion of land intercropped by intercropping farmers.  Low levels of both the incidence and intensity of CBI on farms
contribute to the aggregate low level of CBI. The objective of this paper was to identify the reasons for the low intensity
(rather than incidence) of CBI at individual farm level.
Specific objectives were:
i)  to identify and quantify the farm-level resource constraints of the present intercroppers
ii)  to analyse the effectiveness of existing government intercropping policies.
iii)   to identify prospective policies and their likely effectiveness in increasing the intensity of CBI
Hypotheses based on these objectives included the following:
i) Farm-level resource constraints of intercropping are: the coconut area farmed, family and hired labour available for
farm work, and the availability of cash.
ii) Existing CBI policies are not effective in increasing the intensity of adoption and farm income.i)  Policy changes could increase the intensity of CBI.
Model
113 smallholders who intercropped were surveyed in detail by interview (Fernando et al 2003). From this data a Multi-
period Linear Programming (MLP) model was developed for each of three farmer groups (resource-poor: Group 1, middle-
income: Group 2, affluent: Group 3), categorized using cluster analysis. Table 1 shows some of the features of the groups.






Family  Labour for farm
work man days/year
295.3 217.4 163.3
Coconut area  ha 3.73 9.9 15.5
% of land intercropped 48.4 43.0 37.0
Rice land area ha 1.08 1.59 2.02
Total Income Rs/year 163,854 322,821 571,672BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
Variables included were intercropping, rice farming, maintenance of existing coconuts, off-farm work, labour hiring, cash
borrowing and paying family living expenses.
Objective function
The objective function was formulated to maximize the present value of future incomes at a 10% real rate of risk discount
rate.
Planning horizon
With crops growing for five years the planning period was nine years. Figure 1 shows the layout of the MLP model.






Notes: P - Model periods 




Activities in the model
Rice growing; selling and consumption, off-farm work in four seasons, an existing mature coconut maintaining activity,
growing four intercrops (pineapple, banana, betel, ginger), labour hiring in four seasons, cash borrowing, household
expenditure and an activity transferring unused capital from one year to the next year.Objective function entries
The entries in the objective function in each year were the discounted values of: a) gross margins of alternative
production activities, b) variable cost of rice growing and maintaining of existing mature coconuts, c) selling price of rice
and coconut, d) wage rates for hired labour and off-farm working, and e) interest rates on loan.  A complementary effect
of intercropping on coconut yield was included. The MLP maximizes the total Present Value of future incomes over the
nine years.
Constraints in the model
These comprise: land, labour, own capital, borrowing capital, an equality constraint to meet the minimum household
expenditure, an equality constraint forcing the cultivation of rice to meet the household demand, agronomic restrictions,
continuation of the existing coconut palms. These were different for the three farmer groups.
Seasonality of labour
Four seasons of labour demand were identified, namely S1 (October - January), S2 (February - April), S3 (May - July)
and S4 (August - September).  Family and hired labour availability in each season of each year was computed.
Coefficients
For each activity the unit values and coefficients of resource use were based on the survey (Fernando 2003) and research
data from the Coconut Research Institute
Results and Discussion
i)  Model Results
Table 2 shows the model solutions which identify the constraints for the expansion of existing CBI under the current policy
setting – i.e. in the absence of fertiliser subsidy, at prevailing market interest rates on loans, etc.
Table 2  Base model solutions for three farmer groups
Attribute Farmer Groups
Group 1 Resource-poor Group 2 Middle-income Group 3 Affluent








not  planted  frequently;
cash  intensive







Rs 168 532 Rs 247 053 Rs 265 168
Level of off-farm
activities
Off-farm  working  in  all
seasons  of  first  two
periods,  but  declines  in
later  periods
Less allocation of family
labour for off-farm work
than Group 1
No family labour in off-
farm work
Resource Use
- highland Highest use of highland
for intercropping (97%) in
period 8
Highest  area  attained
under  intercropping  is
(48%) in period 6
Highest  area  under
intercropping  (33%)  in
period 6
- lowland Rice growing (0.31 ac) in
each of 9 periods
0.36 ac required for rice
consumption
0.26 ac required for rice
consumption
Labour
- family labour Slack  in  early  periods,
binding in later periods
Always fully used Always fully used
- hired labour Slack in early periods Always  fully  utilized  in
S4
Always  fully  utilized  in
S4
Capital Binding from the first to
third period
Binding only during the
first period
Constantly  in  surplus
supply
Credit Fully used up to the third
period
Some borrowing in the
first period
No borrowing
Note: 1 US $ = Rs 96 on 22.11.2002.
Group 1 (Resource-poor farmers)•   Due to scarcity of cash, expansion of intercropping takes place slowly in the first three periods.  As cash is generated,
land is almost fully (97%) used for intercropping towards the end of the planning period. Thus, land may become
limiting.
•   After period 3, family labour is fully used in all but S2, when slack labour is used for off farm work, and has a high
Marginal Value Product (MVP) in S4.
•   Hired labour is completely used up in S4 and some used in S1 after period three. The MVPs of hired labour in scarce
seasons are greater than the market wage rate
•   Rice-growing constantly competes especially for family labour.
•   Cash is scarce and credit fully utilised in the first three periods when the MVP of cash is higher than the current
market-borrowing rate but is surplus thereafter, implying that the provision of credits at current market borrowing rate
could expand intercropping.
Group 2 (middle-income farmers)
•   Land is not binding as only 48% of the potential used for intercropping.
•   Rice growing competes for family labour.
•   Family labour is constantly binding.
•   Labour allocation for off-farm work is reduced, as the opportunity cost is high.
•   Hired labour is substantially used in S1, is binding in S4 throughout, and the MVPs are higher than the market
wages.,
•   Cash is in short supply only in the first period, and credit supply not fully utilised due to labour scarcity
Group 3 (affluent farmers)
•   Only 33% of the potential land used for intercropping.
•   Family labour allocation for off-farm work is the lowest of the groups.
•   Family labour is binding throughout.
•   Hired labour is substantially used in S1, is binding in S4 throughout, and the MVPs are higher than the market
wages.,
•   Cash is in surplus in every period and no loans are taken out as labour is binding.
Sensitivity Analysis
In terms of land used for intercropping, and farm income five scenarios were examined (Table 3)
a) An optional “rice buying” activity was included to relax the rice growing constraint.  All groups shift from
rice growing to rice-buying, although Group 1 only after period 3 when cash has been generated. This increases the
intercropping and the income.b) Off-farm income may act as a risk-spreading mechanism.  With no off-farm work total income is reduced, limiting
cash so intercropping is reduced especially for Group1, and risk is increased.
c)  Increased wages, resulting from labour scarcity, reduces farm income and increases intercropped area with a move to
more extensive less labour demanding crops.
d)  Labour-saving farm mechanization could increase the availability of family labour which was therefore scaled
upwards and downwards by 10, 25 or 50 per cent. Increased supply of family labour increases the intercropping and farm
income in all three groups.
e)  The availability of hired labour was scaled upward and downward by 10, 25, and 50%.  Increased labour greatly
increased intercropping and farm income especially for Groups 2 & 3.
Table 3 Results of sensitivity analysis (% of base model results)











Intercropped land + 3.6 + 7.8 + 4.0
Farm income + 3.8 + 5.0 + 3.5
Absence  of  off-farm
work opportunities
Intercropped land - 13.0 - 9.0 - 3.0
Farm income - 3.3 - 0.1 - 0.0
Increased  wages  for
hired labour
     by 10% Intercropped land + 4.9 + 3.9 + 1.3
Farm income - 0.2 - 1.0 - 1.1
     by 20% Intercropped land + 4.9 + 13.6 + 13.2
Farm income - 0.3 - 1.8 - 2.0
     by 30% Intercropped land + 4.8 + 13.6 + 20.0
Farm income - 0.4 - 2.5 - 3.0
Varying  the  availabilityof family labour
     by +25% Intercropped land + 1.7 + 4.9 + 4.7
Farm income + 13.5 + 9.6 + 6.7
     by +50% Intercropped land + 27.0 + 10.3 + 8.3
Farm income + 1.7 + 19.1 + 13.4
     by –25% Intercropped land - 12.0 - 5.4 - 5.3
Farm income - 14.0 - 9.6 - 6.7
     by –50% Intercropped land - 26.0 - 12.0 - 11.0
Farm income - 29.0 - 19.2 - 13.5
Varying  the  availability
of hired labour
     by +25% Intercropped land + 1.7 + 27.0 + 28.2
Farm income + 8.7 + 16.3 + 18.5
     by +50% Intercropped land + 4.0 + 53.8 + 56.4
Farm income + 17.0 + 32.7 + 37.0
     by –25% Intercropped land - 20.0 - 27.0 - 29.3
Farm income - 8.7 - 16.4 - 18.5
     by –50% Intercropped land - 33.0 - 55.0 - 60.0
Farm income - 18.0 - 32.9 - 37.0
ii)  Policy Analysis
In terms of intercropped area and farm income, the impacts were explored of a fertiliser subsidy, intercropping subsidy,
price support for intercrop output, increased access to loans at the current market borrowing rate, and a subsidised credit
scheme with increased availability (Table 4).
A switch to more extensive intercrops may represent an increase in intercrop land use, but not necessarily the intensity of
intercropping, whereas a shift to more intensive crops may decrease the area intercropped, especially if labour is
binding. Thus some changes may increase farm income yet reduce the intercropped area. The area intercropped may
therefore be a poor indicator of intercropping intensity.
Table 4  Results of policy analysis (% of base model results)
Policy Attribute Farmer Groups
Group1 Group 2 Group 3Reinstating  the  subsidy  on
fertilizer
Intercropped land + 8.8 - 6 - 10
Farm income +15.6 + 8.7 + 9
Intercropping subsidy Intercropped land - 18 - 35 - 44
Farm income + 9.3 + 3.6 + 3.4
Increased output price
     by 10% Intercropped land - 0.1 - 10 - 11
Farm income + 18 + 14 + 15
     by 20% Intercropped land + 5.5 - 7.5 - 10
Farm income + 35 + 30 + 31
     by 30% Intercropped land + 2.6 - 5 - 10
Farm income + 51 + 45 + 46
Combined effect of output price
increase  by  10%    +  increased
supply of family and hired labor in
S4
     by 10% Intercropped land + 3.8 + 8 + 0.9
Farm income + 26 + 24 + 25
     by 20% Intercropped land + 21 + 65 + 33
Farm income + 32 + 40 + 33
     by 30% Intercropped land + 29 + 99 + 63
Farm income + 38 + 48 + 40
Increased  availability of loans
     by +25% Intercropped land + 8.7 A B
Farm income + 10 A B
     by +50% Intercropped land + 25 A B
Farm income + 18 A B
     by +100% Intercropped land + 30 A B
Farm income + 24 A B
Subsidized credits Intercropped land - 0.6 0 No effect
Farm income + 0.7 + 0.1 No effectIncreased  supply  of  subsidized
credits
     by +10% Intercropped land - 0.6 C No effect
Farm income + 0.7 C No effect
     by +50% Intercropped land + 23 C No effect
Farm income + 19 C No effect
     by +100% Intercropped land + 34 C No effect
Farm income + 25 C No effect
Notes:A - There are unutilized loans in the base scenario, and so this policy was not explored further.
B – Farmers did not borrow any money in the base model because cash was surplus during the    entire 9-year planning
horizon.
C- Since the level of loans taken was less than their availability, there is no benefit from increasing the supply of low-
interest loans.
The policies examined accelerate the early expansion of intercropping, but make fairly small changes over the nine years
as labour is binding. Input subsidies and price support policies raise farm income, but their impact on expanding the CBI
is small or negative in all three groups. Fertiliser subsidies work better than output subsidies which, for the more affluent
farmers, provide a greater absolute increase in income. Simultaneous increases in CBI and farm income require
increasing seasonal labour, or raising labour productivity in peak periods and for Group1 providing credit
Discussion and Conclusions
Lack of credit for Group 1 in the initial years is a problem while Group 2 use some additional credit.  There is only a
marginal additional response if the credit is subsidised.  With credit available, Group 1 may utilise all the available land.
For all groups, labour is binding particularly in S4 when rice harvest and intercrop work clash, but particularly for Groups
2 & 3.  Alleviating these would work much better at increasing both intercropped area and farm income than the
subsidies that have been tried, which do increase farm income and so have been popular with farmers.
Group 1 farmers are least likely to have adequate collateral for credit and may default on loans as has often happened
with previous agricultural loan schemes.  Intercropping is not without risk of disease, pests, weather and price
fluctuations, which might affect the ability of Group 1 farmers to repay credit.  Family labour availability is constrained by
rice production and rice harvest is perhaps more easily mechanised than intercrops.  Existing machinery sharing
arrangements might be improved and research and development devoted to appropriate rice production mechanisation,
(e.g. rice harvesters) to release labour for intercropping.  Moisture conservation measures would spread the workingseason and also needs investigation.  Hired labour is available but many workers prefer non agricultural employment.
Group 3 includes professional and other occupations who have neither time nor expertise to intercrop themselves. Their
present practice of taking landless labourer families from rural areas and settling them on their farms works well, providing
labour for farm work on a regular basis.  However tenancy laws can lead to tenants claiming ownership, which creates a
reluctance to offer tenancies or share cropping.
This study shows that even within the smallholder sector there are distinctly different groups whose constraints and
responses differ. Therefore differential targeting of policies may be required.  Policies, which improve income may be
popular with the farmers but may not increase intercropping if other resources are limiting expansion.  The results of the
MLP reveal that expansion of CBI is mainly constrained by seasonal labour shortages for all farmer groups, particularly
the affluent Group 3, and by the scarcity of cash in the case of resource-poor farmers Group 1. CBI policies aimed at
subsidising inputs or intercrop prices are not likely to be efficient in raising adoption; policies aimed at alleviating
resource constraints would be more effective.  This study has demonstrated the usefulness of MLP for providing guidelines
for policy.
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